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Abstract: This paper studies an approach for detecting cyber attacks against networked cooperative
systems (NCS) that are assumed to be working in a cyber-physical environment. NCS are prone to
anomalies both due to cyber and physical attacks and faults. Cyber-attacks being more hazardous
given the cooperative nature of the NCS may lead to disastrous consequences and thus need to
be detected as soon as they occur by all systems in the network. Our approach deals with two
types of malicious attacks aimed at compromising the stability of the NCS: intrusion attacks/local
malfunctions on individual systems and deception/cyber-attacks on the communication between
the systems. In order to detect and identify such attacks under switching communication topologies,
this paper proposes a new distributed methodology that solves global state estimation of the NCS
where the aim is identifying anomalies in the networked system using residuals generated by
monitoring agents such that coverage of the entire network is assured. A cascade of predefined-time
sliding mode switched observers is introduced for each agent to achieve a fast estimate of the global
state whereby the settling time is an a priori defined parameter independently of the initial conditions.
Then, using the conventional consensus algorithm, a set of residuals are generated by the agents
that is capable of detecting and isolating local intrusion attacks and communication cyber-attacks
in the network using only locally exchanged information. In order to prove the effectiveness of
the proposed method, the framework is tested for a velocity synchronization seeking network of
mobile robots.
Keywords: cyber security; networked control systems; predefined-time observers; multi-agent
systems; cyber-physical systems; fault detection and isolation; switching topologies
1. Introduction
Networked Control Systems are control systems where the control loops are closed through a
communication network whereby necessary signals for the control mission are exchanged among
the system components through a network, namely wireless. Indeed, one of the main advantages of
such systems is the capability of connecting their cyberspace to their physical space thus enabling the
execution of several tasks from long distance. Figure 1 represents an example of a NCS, its environment
and basic components. These systems, sometimes referred to as cyber-physical systems (CFS) [1,2]
or multi-agent systems (MAS) in the literature [3], have attracted a lot of research interest in recent
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years due to their numerous potential use in various applications and industries ranging from flocking
of mobile vehicles, terrestrial exploration, manufacturing plant monitoring, formation control in
spacecraft flights to unmanned aerial vehicles and autonomous underwater vehicles, just to mention a
few (see [4–9]).
However, the nature of NCS makes them extremely vulnerable to external malicious attacks while
sharing information through a wireless network, which may compromise the efficiency of cooperative
control algorithms and can lead to heavily degraded performances of the overall system and possibly
to catastrophic effects. Consequently, the issue of cyber security in such systems has been attracting
considerable attention in the literature [10,11].
Some of the research works have focused on local physical component faults, namely actuator
and sensor faults (e.g., [12–16]). A relatively recent survey of different approaches to fault diagnosis in
swarm systems was presented in [17], where the advantages of distributed designs in contrast with
centralized and decentralized ones have been highlighted.
System security plays an increasingly enhanced role in the reliability of NCS as it allows
for maintaining unbiased user defined coordination between the agents by detecting violating
and malicious information. A few potential ways to violate security measures are deception or
cyber-attacks. Indeed, these types of attacks are usually more difficult to identify as they can be
coordinated. They typically include false data injection attacks (FDIA) [18], denial of service (DoS) [19],
replay attacks [20], amongst others. Indeed, such types of attacks are aimed at destabilising the network
by injecting control structures with deceptive information. A number of instances have been outlined
in the past [21]. Detecting them has thus become a central focus for system security and control.
2. Related Work and Contribution
When it comes to cyber security in NCS, some of the works in literature has tackled problems such
as false data injection in state estimation [18], secure computations in networked systems [22], to name
a few. One way to increase resilience of MAS with respect to these faults is to design a robust control
algorithm that is resilient to the effects of certain faults and attacks [23]. Another way, as pointed out
in [24], is to develop monitoring schemes to detect failures in the MAS caused by attacks and faults.
On the other hand, [25] has provided an exhaustive literature review on model-based techniques
in fault detection and isolation where observer-based techniques have proven to be powerful
software-based tools in fault diagnosis due to their efficiency and online implementation capability.
Such techniques have been used for instance in [26–35] for cyber-attack detection in NCS.
However, most of the works on observer-based attack detection of control systems consider
centralized architectures, second order systems or do not consider the case of a possibly dynamic
communication topologies. Unfortunately, the study of global fault detection for NCS with switching
topologies subject to cyber-attacks is still in its infancy.
Motivated by all of the above and the recent works in [36] where a novel approach called
predefined-time stability has been proposed, this paper introduces a new approach to identify faults
and deception attacks in a cooperating networked system with a switching topology. The objective
in this work is to deal with these non-cooperative and malicious activities. The proposed protocol
makes an agent act as a central node monitoring the whole system activities in a distributed fashion.
Compared to the existing works in the literature, our main contributions are:
(1) The design of a bank of distributed predefined-time sliding mode observers (SMO) for global state
estimation for a multi-agent system with integrator dynamics whereby the convergence time is
an a priori user defined parameter, in order to overcome the problem of attack detection under
switching topologies.
(2) A residual based approach is proposed where the equivalent control concept is used to detect
different faults and attacks that might occur anywhere in the system (i.e., an intrusion attack
reflective of a local malfunction in agent or a cyber-attack affecting a communication link between
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two agents) in a distributed way based on the topological properties of the network. This allows
detection and identification of multiple simultaneous attacks and intrusions.
Figure 1. An illustration of a networked control system, basic components, cyber-physical layers and
possible attack types.
The rest of the manuscript is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief background on
graph theory. Section 3 introduces some important definitions, lemmas and the problem formulation
of the global fault detection and identification issue. Section 4 presents the main results, namely the
design of banks of distributed predefined-time sliding mode observers for state estimation and residual
generation based on local information. Section 5 presents numerical simulation results, where our
approach is applied in the context of a practical application to consensus seeking fleet of mobile robots,
in order to show the efficacy of our approach. Finally, Section 6 draws the main conclusions of this
work and present future scopes for research on the considered topic.
Notations: The superscript T stands for the matrix transpose and we denote by I the identity
matrix and by 1 the vector with all elements one, both with appropriate dimensions. The set of
real-valued m× n matrices is given by IRm×n. λmin (·) represents the smallest non-zero eigenvalue
of a square matrix [·]. ‖ · ‖1 and ‖ · ‖2 denote the 1- and 2- norms, respectively. (·)eq refers to the
equivalent control value of (·) and D+(·) refers to the upper right-hand Dini derivative of (·). For the
sake of simplicity, the time argument is omitted when it is not required for clarity. Table 1 presents a list of
the employed acronyms:
Table 1. List of acronyms.
NCS Networked Control Systems
CPS Cyber-Physical Systems
MAS Multi-Agent Systems
FDI Fault Detection and Isolation
SMO Sliding Mode Observers
FDIA False Data Injection Attacks
DoS Denial of Service
3. Graph Theory
In this paper, we are going to refer to networked systems as multi-agent systems and given
that networked multi-agent systems need to exchange information amongst them, it is natural to
model them using graph theory. In general, a communication topology composed of N systems is
represented by Q = (N ,F ) whereby N = {1, ..., N} is the node set consisting of N nodes/vertices
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each representing an agent, and F ⊆ N ×N is the edge set representing the communication links
between two agents. Here, we shall assume that Q is connected, undirected and Ni ⊂ {1, ..., N}\{i}
is a non-empty subset of agents that agent i can interact with. In this work, we shall further assume
that the communication topology is time-varying. As a result, we denote by T̃ = {τ1, τ2, ..., τM}
set of all possible known topologies and by M := {1, ..., M} the set of indices corresponding to
these topologies. More precisely, the communication topology is characterised by a switching graph
Qσ(t) = Q(t) where σ(t) : [0, ∞) −→ M is piecewise constant switching signal and determines the
communication topology with 0 = t0 < t1 < t2... being the switching instants of σ(t). Furthermore,
it is assumed that σ(t) satisfies the minimum dwell time condition [37], and tw+1 − tw = τw < Tw with
Tw a known constant. Therefore, when σ(t) = s ∈ M, the topology Q(t) = Qσ(t) = Qs is activated.
For the rest of this paper, we refer to the active mode using the superscript s. The adjacency matrix
As = [asij] ∈ IR
N×N is defined by asij > 0 when the i
th agent can receive information from the jth agent
and asij = 0 otherwise. The diagonal of matrix A
s is null since self-connections are not allowed. Let Ds
be the in-degree diagonal matrix with entries dsi = ∑
N
j=1 a
s
ij. Then, the Laplacian matrix Ls is defined as:
Ls = Ds − As ∈ IRN×N
Let us denote by Lsi ∈ IR
(N−1)×(N−1) the Laplacian matrix Ls defined without agent i, and by:
Li,s = diag(`i,s1 , . . . , `
i,s
i−1, `
i,s
i+1, . . . , `
i,s
N ) ∈ IR
(N−1)×(N−1)
the associated diagonal matrix defining the interconnections between agent i and the remaining agents
under the active topology s, `i,sk > 0 if information of agent i is accessible by the k
th agent; otherwise
`i,sk = 0.
4. Preliminaries and Problem Statement
Before stating the main results, a brief overview of the techniques employed in our work are
presented hereafter.
4.1. Definitions and Useful Lemmas
Consider the following nonlinear system:{
ξ̇(t) = Φ(t, ξ(t); φ)
ξ(0) = ξ0
(1)
where ξ(t) ∈ IRn is the state and φ ∈ IRg where g ∈ IN is the system parameters considered to be
constant (φ̇ = 0). Φ : IR+ × IRn is assumed to be a nonlinear function with its origin as an equilibrium
point, i.e., Φ(t, 0; φ) = 0.
Definition 1 ([38]). The origin of (1) is said to be globally finite-time stable if it is globally asymptotically
stable and any solution ξ(t, ξ0) of (1) reaches the equilibrium point at some finite time moment, i.e., ∀t > Γ(ξ0),
ξ(t, ξ0) = 0, where Γ : IRn −→ IR+ ∪ {0} is called the settling-time function.
Definition 2 ([39]). The origin of (1) is a globally fixed-time equilibrium if it is globally finite-time stable and
there exists a strictly positive number Tmax such that for all ξ0 ∈ IRn the settling-time function Γ : IRn → IR+
is bounded, i.e., Γ(ξ0) 6 Tmax for all ξ0 ∈ IRn, the solution ξ(t, ξ0) of system (3) is defined and ξ(t, ξ0) ∈ IRn
for t ∈ [0, Tmax) : limt→Tmax ξ(t, ξ0) = 0.
Definition 3 ([36]). For the parameter vector φ of system (1) and a constant Tp := Tp(φ) > 0, the origin of
(1) is said to be predefined-time stable if it is fixed-time stable and the settling-time function Γ : IRn → IR is such
that for all ξ0 ∈ IRn, Γ(ξ0) 6 Tp and Tp = supξ0∈IRn Γ(ξ0).
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Let us recall some lemmas concerning predefined-time stability.
Lemma 1 ([40]). Consider the system
ξ̇(t) = − (α|ξ(t)|p + η|ξ(t)|q)r sign(ξ(t)), ξ(0) = ξ0
with ξ ∈ IR. The parameters of the system are real numbers α, η, p, q, r > 0 satisfying the constraints rp < 1,
rq > 1. Let φ = [α, η, p, q, r]T ∈ IR5 be the parameter vector, then its origin ξ = 0 is fixed-time stable and the
settling time function satisfies T(ξ0) ≤ Tf = γ(φ), where:
γ(φ) =
Γ( 1−rpq−p )Γ(
rq−1
q−p )
Γ(r)(q− p)αr
(
α
η
) 1−rp
q−p
(2)
and Γ(·) is the well known Gamma function defined as Γ(z) =
∫ +∞
0 e
−ttz−1dt.
Remark 1. The concept of predefined-time stability is introduced where a settling time bound Tp is set in
advance as a function of system parameters φ, i.e., Tp = Tp(φ), and a strong notion of this class of stability is
given when Tp = Tf , i.e., Tp is the least upper bound of the settling time.
Lemma 2 ([40]). Let us consider the nonlinear system (1) with ξ(0) as the initial condition, where ξ(t) ∈ IRn
is the state and φ ∈ IRu with u ∈ IN, is the system parameters considered to be constant. Φ : IR+ × IRn is
assumed to be a nonlinear function with its origin as an equilibrium point. Suppose there exists a continuous
radially unbounded candidate Lyapunov function V : IRn → IR such that
V(0) = 0
V(ξ) > 0, ∀ξ ∈ IRn\{0},
and its derivative along the trajectories of (1) satisfies
D+V(ξ) 6 − γ(φ)Tp (αV
p + ηVq)r , ∀ξ ∈ IRn\{0},
with α, η, p, q, r > 0, rp < 1, rq > 1, γ(φ) is given in (2) and D+V is the upper right-hand Dini derivative of
V(ξ). Then, the origin is predefined-time stable with predefined time Tp.
Now, let us recall some complementary key lemmas that will be used throughout this paper.
Lemma 3. Let n ∈ N. If a = (a1, . . . , an) is a sequence of positive numbers, then the following inequality
is satisfied:
1
n
N
∑
i=1
ai
(
αapi + ηa
q
i
)k
>
(
1
n
N
∑
i=1
ai
)(
α
(
1
n
N
∑
i=1
ai
)p
+ η
(
1
n
N
∑
i=1
ai
)q)k
for α, η, p, q, k > 0 with pk < 1 and qk > 1.
Lemma 4. Let f be the function defined as
f (z) = z(αzp + ηzq)k
for α, η, p, q, k > 0 with pk < 1 and qk > 1. Then, f (z) is monotonically increasing for all z > 0.
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Lemma 5 ([41]). Let z = [z1, . . . , zN ]T ∈ IRN and
||z||p = p
√√√√ N∑
i=1
|zi|p
Then, ∀l > r: ||z||l 6 ||z||r.
4.2. Problem Statement
Consider a homogeneous multi-agent system composed of N agents labelled by i ∈ {1, ..., N},
and described by the following nth-order dynamics
ξ̇i,1(t) = ξi,2(t)
ξ̇i,2(t) = ξi,3(t)
...
ξ̇i,n−1(t) = ξi,n(t)
ξ̇i,n(t) = ui(t) + f ai (t)
zi(t) = ξi,1(t)
(3)
where ξi,l(t) ∈ IR is agent i’s lth state variable with ξi(t) = [ξi,1(t), ξi,2(t), ..., ξi,n(t)]T ∈ IRn, f ai (t) ∈ IR
is a process fault affecting the dynamics of the agent which could be exogenous and might correspond
to an internal malfunction, local intrusion attack, etc, ui(t) ∈ IR is the control input and zi(t) ∈ IR is
agent i’s internal measurement. Note that there is a multitude of practical applications of such systems,
namely robotic systems, power systems, etc. Research on cyber-attack identification for such systems
is of both practical and theoretical significance.
Furthermore, it is considered that agents have access to their control inputs, but they do not
receive their neighbours’ inputs. If needed, they have to reconstruct them using state estimates from
exchanged information which are possibly corrupted. The exchanged information is expressed as{
zki(t) = `
i,s
k (zi(t) + f̌
e
ki(t)),
ẑkji (t) = a
s
kj(ẑ
j
i(t) + f
e
kj(t))
(4)
where zki(t) ∈ IR is agent i’s output signal sent to agent k with zkk(t) = zk(t), and ẑ
kj
i (t) ∈ IR is agent
j’s estimate of agent i’s output which is sent to agent k, the term ẑji(t) will be defined in the next
Section. Both pieces of information are subject to an edge fault denoted f̌ eki(t) ∈ IR and f
e
kj(t) ∈ IR,
respectively. Note that, these types of faults may affect all broadcasted information of an agent to
another. This might include DoS, FDIA, deception attacks, cyber-attacks, etc. In this paper, a solution
to the following questions is investigated:
• How can we detect a cyber-attack anywhere in the MAS while keeping a distributed approach of
the detection scheme?
• How can we distinguish said attacks from local malfunctions/intrusions?
The conceptual idea in this work is that information locally produced by the sensors is considered
to be secure, while the one sent over the communication network/cyber layer of the system is
vulnerable to external attacks. The next section lays out our main results.
5. Proposed Methodology
The proposed distributed bank of predefined-time observers for output and state estimation and
global cyber-attack detection scheme is laid out in this section.
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5.1. Global Output and State Estimation
Let us define the ’monitored’ agent i as the agent to be diagnosed by a ‘monitoring’ agent k.
First, let us consider the case of a fixed communication topology, where no cyber-attack exists in the
system (i.e., f̌ eki = f
e
kj = 0). Denote by ξ̂
k
i,l , agent k’s estimate of the l
th state variable of agent i and
by ẑki , agent k’s estimate of agent i’s output. The proposed distributed switched observer takes the
following structure: 
˙̂ξki,1 = ξ̂
k
i,2 + V(Iki,1) = ẑki
...
˙̂ξki,n−1 = ξ̂
k
i,n + E
s
n−2V(Iki,n−1)
˙̂ξki,n = E
s
n−1V(Iki,n)
(5)
with V(Iki,l) = κ
k,s
l
(
(α|Iki,l |
p + η|Iki,l |
q)r + δsl
)
sign(Iki,l),{
Iki,1 = ∑
N
j=1 a
s
kj(ẑ
kj
i − ẑ
k
i ) + `
i,s
k (zki − ẑ
k
i )
Iki,m = ξ̃ki,m − ξ̂ki,m, m ∈ {2, ..., n}
(6)
The auxiliary state variables ξ̃ki,m, ∀m ∈ {2, ..., n} are defined as
ξ̃ki,2 = ξ̂
k
i,2 + E
s
1κ
k,s
1 δ
s
1sign(Iki,1)eq
...
ξ̃ki,n−1 = ξ̂
k
i,n−1 + E
s
n−2κ
k,s
n−2δ
s
n−2sign(Iki,n−2)eq
ξ̃ki,n = ξ̂
k
i,n + E
s
n−1κ
k,s
n−1δ
s
n−1sign(Iki,n−1)eq
(7)
where the subscript eq denotes the equivalent value of sign function. In the following, it is assumed
that the effect of the filter dynamics is negligible w.r.t. those of the observer. Let us define the errors as{
εki,1 = zki − ẑki
εki,m = ξi,m − ξ̂ki,m, ∀m ∈ {2, ..., n}
Differentiating them yields the following error dynamics:
ε̇ki,1 = ε
k
i,2 − κ
k,s
1
(
(α|Iki,1|p + η|Iki,1|q)r + δs1
)
sign(Iki,1)
...
ε̇ki,n−1 = ε
k
i,n − Esn−2κ
k,s
n−1
(
(α|Iki,n−1|p + η|Iki,n−1|q)r
+δsn−1
)
sign(Iki,n−1)
ε̇ki,n = ui + f
a
i − Esn−1κ
k,s
n
(
(α|Iki,n|p + η|Iki,n|q)r + δsn
)
sign(Iki,n)
(8)
where Iki,1 can be expressed in terms of the output estimation errors as
Iki,1 = ∑
N
j=1 a
s
kj(ε
j
i,1 − ε
k
i,1) + `
i,s
k ε
k
i,1. Putting (8) in compact form, the following is obtained:
Ėi,1 = Ei,2 −H(Ei,1)
...
Ėi,n−1 = Ei,n − Esn−2H(Ei,n−1)
Ėi,n = 1(ui + f ai )− Esn−1H(Ei,n)
(9)
where for each agent ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N} and ∀l ∈ {1, ..., n}, the estimation errors, the state estimates
and the auxiliary variables are concatenated in the vectors: Ei,l = [ε1i,l , ..., ε
N
i,l ]
T , X̂i,l = [ξ̂1i,l , ..., ξ̂
N
i,l ]
T ,
X̃i,l = [ξ̃1i,l , ..., ξ̃
N
i,l ]
T . Let us denote Lsi = Li,s + Lsi . The termsH(Ei,l), ∀l ∈ {1, ..., n} are expressed as
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{
H(Ei,1) = κi,s1
(
(α|Lsi Ei,1|p + η|Lsi Ei,1|q)k + δs1
)
sign(Lsi Ei,1)
H(Ei,m) = κi,sm
(
(α|Ei,m|p + η|Ei,m|q)k + δsm
)
sign(Ei,m), ∀m ∈ {2, ..., n}
Assumption 1. For every agent, the state variables, the control and fault signals are bounded, and their
maximum values are known, i.e., for ξ̄i,l , ū, f̄ a ∈ IR+, i ∈ {1, ..., N} and l ∈ {1, ..., n}: |ξi,l(t)| 6 ξ̄i,l ,
|ui(t)| 6 ū, | f ai (t)| 6 f̄ a.
Theorem 1. Given Assumption 1, for a fixed communication topology and in the absence of cyber-attack, for each
agent, the observation errors (9) converge towards zero in a predefined time Ts = ∑n−1j=1 T
j,s
p independently of
initial conditions, with the observer gains:
δsq =
ξ̄i,q+1
κsq
, ∀q ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}
δsn =
ū + f̄ a
κn
(10)
with 
κi,s1 =
Nγ(φ)
λsi T
1,s
p
κi,sm =
Nγ(φ)
Tm,sp
, ∀m ∈ {2, ..., n}
and
Esq =
{
1 when t > ∑
q
j=1 T
j,s
p
0 otherwise
, ∀q ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}
where κsm = min{κ1,sm , . . . , κN,sm } and λmin(Lsi ) = λsi . γ(φ) is defined in Equation (2), Esm represents the
observer switches and Tm,sp is the settling-time for each dynamic which is an user-defined parameter, considered
to be the same for all of the mth dynamics of the agents for notational convenience.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is done step by step by taking advantage of the switching conditions.
Indeed, due to this, at each step, only a one-dimensional, corresponding sub-dynamical system
is studied.
Step 1: Initially, Es1 = E
s
2 = ... = 0, the error dynamics are expressed as
Ėi,1 = Ei,2 −H(Ei,1)
...
Ėi,n−1 = Ei,n
Ėi,n = 1( f ai + ui)
(11)
Consider the following Lyapunov function associated with the concatenated first error dynamics
of the agents
Vi1 =
1
N
√
λsi ETi,1Lsi Ei,1
Differentiating it results in
D+Vi1 =
1
N
√
λsi
ETi,1Lsi E i,1
ETi,1Lsi (Ei,2 −H(Ei,1)) (12)
By setting S1 = [s11, . . . , sN1 ]T = Lsi Ei,1, one obtains
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D+Vi1 =
√
λsi
N
(
− 1√
ETi,1Lsi Ei,1
∑Ni=1 κ
i,s
1 |si1|(α|si1|p + η|si1|q)r
−
δs1√
ETi,1Lsi Ei,1
∑Ni=1 κ
i,s
1 |si1|+
ETi,1Lsi Ei,2√
ST1 Ei,1
) (13)
Then, it follows that
D+Vi1 =
√
λsi
N
(−∆1(S1) + ∆2(S1))
with {
∆1(S1) = (ETi,1Lsi Ei,1)
− 12 ∑Ni=1 κ
i,s
1 |si1|(α|si1|p + η|si1|q)r
∆2(S1) = −δs1(ETi,1Lsi Ei,1)
− 12 ∑Ni=1 κ
i,s
1 |si1|+ ETi,1Lsi Ei,2(ST1 Ei,1)
− 12
Considering Lemma 3, and taking into account the fact that ∑Ni=1 κ
i,s
1 > κ
s
1 and ||S1||1 = ∑
N
i=1 |si1|,
the term ∆1(S1) can be expressed as
∆1(S1) >
κs1||S1||1√
ETi,1Lsi Ei,1
(α( 1N ∑
N
i=1 ||S1||1)p + η( 1N ∑
N
i=1 ||S1||1)q)r (14)
Using Lemma 5, it can be shown that
||S1||1 > ||S1||2 = (S1)T(S1) =
√
(Ei,1)T(Lsi )2(Ei,1) (15)
By expressing Ei,1 as a linear combination of the eigenvectors of Lsi , the term ETi,1(Lsi )2Ei,1 can be
bounded as
ETi,1(Lsi )2Ei,1 > λsi ETi,1Lsi Ei,1
Thus, using Lemma 4, one has
−∆1(S1) 6 −κs1
√
λsi
(
α(Vi1)
p + η(Vi1)
q)r (16)
On the other hand, from the second term ∆2(S1), the following can be deduced
∆2(S1) 6 λsi
(
−
δs1
||S1||
∑Ni=1 κ
i,s
1 |si1|+
(S1)T
||S1||
(Ei,2)
)
6 λsi (−κs1δs1 + ξ̄i,2)
6 0
(17)
By combining (16) and (17), the following is obtained from (13)
D+Vi1 6 −
κs1
N
λsi
(
α(Vi1)
p + η(Vi1)
q)r
6 −γ(φ)
T1,sp
(
α(Vi1)
p + η(Vi1)
q)r (18)
Therefore, in accordance with Lemma 2, Ei,1 converges towards the origin with the settling time
T1,sp (i.e., Ei,1 = Ėi,1 = 0). As a result, at t = T1,sp (Es1 = 1), we have
Ei,2 −H(Ei,1)eq = Xi,2 − X̂i,2 −H(Ei,1)eq
= 0
(19)
Hence, one gets X̃i,2 = Xi,2. At this point, one can go to the next step.
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Step 2: At t = T1,sp , the error dynamics become
Ėi,2 = Ei,3 −H(Ei,2)
...
Ėi,n−1 = Ei,n
Ėi,n = 1( f ai + ui)
(20)
Selecting the Lyapunov function Vi2 =
1
N
√
ETi,2Ei,2 and by following the same reasoning as before,
one gets
−∆1(S2) 6 −κs2
(
α(Vi2)
p + η(Vi2)
q)r
∆2(S2) 6 −
δs2
||S2||
∑Ni=1 κ
i,s
2 |si2|+
(S2)T(Ei,3)
||S2||
6 −κs2δs2 + ξ̄i,3
6 0
(21)
with S2 = [s12, . . . , sN2 ]T = Ei,2. Then, it is straightforward to show that
D+Vi2 6 −
γ(φ)
T2,sp
(
α(Vi2)
p + η(Vi2)
q)r. Consequently, Ei,2 converges towards the origin with the
settling time T1,sp + T
2,s
p (i.e., Ei,2 = Ėi,2 = 0). Therefore, at t = T1,sp + T2,sp and Es2 = 1.
Step n: Now, fast forward to the nth step, at t = ∑n−1j=1 T
j,s
p , the error dynamics become
Ėi,n = 1( f ai + ui)−H(Ei,n) (22)
Taking as the Lyapunov function Vin =
1
N
√
(Ei,n)T(Ei,n) and by setting Sn = [s1n, . . . , sNn ]T = Ei,n,
and following the same procedure as before, the following inequalities are obtained for the terms
∆1(Sn) and ∆2(Sn)
−∆1(Sn) 6 −κsn
(
α(Vin)p + η(Vin)q
)r
∆2(S2) 6 −
δsn
||Sn||
∑Ni=1 κ
i,s
n |sin|+
(Sn)T1(ū + f̄ a)
||Sn||
6 −κsnδsn + ū + f̄ a
6 0
(23)
The proof is thus concluded at the nth step.
Now, let us consider the presence of a possible cyber-attack in the network. Due to the presence
of these attacks, the output estimation errors is expressed as
εki,1 = zi − ẑki + `
i,s
k f̌
e
ki + ∑
N
j=1 a
s
kj f
e
kj (24)
In this case, the following theorem can be stated.
Theorem 2. Given Assumption 1 and in the presence of one or multiple cyber attacks incident to agent k,
in the case of fixed communication topology, the observation errors converge towards zero in a predefined time
Ts = ∑n−1j=1 T
j,s
p independently of initial conditions, and the gains are given as
δsq =
ξ̄i,q+1 + F̄s
(q)
k
κsq
, ∀q ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}
δsn =
ū + f̄ a + F̄s
(n)
k
κsn
(25)
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with
Fs
(l)
k =
dl
dtl
(`i,sk f̌
e
ki +
N
∑
j=1
askj f
e
kj), ∀l ∈ {1, ..., n}
where Fs
(l)
k corresponds to the l
th time derivative of Fsk = `
i,s
k f̌
e
ki + ∑
N
j=1 a
s
kj f
e
kj and F̄
s(l)
k is the corresponding
upper bound. The gains κi,sl and the observer switches E
s
m remain the same as in Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. When cyber-attacks are considered, (6) becomes
Iki,1 = ∑
N
j=1 a
s
kj(ẑ
j
i − ẑ
k
i ) + `
i,s
k (zi − ẑ
k
i )
+∑Nj=1 a
s
kj f
e
kj + `
i,s
k f̌
e
ki,
Iki,m = ξ̃ki,m − ξ̂ki,m, m ∈ {2, ..., n}
(26)
Furthermore, the auxiliary variables (7) become
ξ̃ki,2 = ξ̂
k
i,2 + E
s
1V(Iki,1)eq = ξ̂ki,2 + εki,2 − `
i,s
k
˙̌f eki
−∑Nj=1 askj ḟ
e
kj
...
ξ̃ki,n = ξ̂
k
i,n + E
s
n−1V(Iki,n−1)eq = ξ̂ki,n + εki,n
−`i,sk f̌
e(n−1)
ki −∑
N
j=1 a
s
kj f
e(n−1)
kj
(27)
and the concatenated errors are expressed as
Ėi,1 = Ei,2 + 1Fs
(1)
k −H(Ei,1)
...
Ėi,n−1 = Ei,n + 1Fs
(n−1)
k − E
s
n−2H(Ei,n−1)
Ėi,n = 1(ui + f ai + Fs
(n)
k )− E
s
n−1H(Ei,n)
(28)
The rest of the proof straightforwardly follows the same reasoning as Theorem 1 and is thus
omitted for brevity.
Note that the use of the predefined-time concept is very useful when dealing with switching
topologies. Indeed, using our proposed scheme, one can immediately derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Consider the switching topologies described in Section 2. Selecting Ts such that Ts < Tw,
∀s ∈ M and observer parameters (25), the distributed switched observers guarantee the predefined-time stability
of the estimation errors regardless of initial conditions at each switching instant.
Remark 2. The global fault estimation protocol proposed in this paper, is a distributed one. Each neighbouring
agent can only exchange local information during the fault estimation process. Furthermore, provided that
all of the possible topologies are known to all agents, constants λsi and therefore κ
s
1 = min{κ
1,s
1 , . . . , κ
N,s
1 }
can be computed a priori. If all Tm,sp are the same (i.e., T
1,s
p = . . . = T
n,s
p = Tp), κs1 =
Nγ(φ)
gTp with
g = max{λs1, . . . , λsN}.
5.2. Residual Definition and Cyber-Attack Identification
The idea is to compute the difference between the actual input of an agent and the estimated input
effort. The difference should indeed be null in the case of no attacks or faults. The next step is to identify
the source and type of faults, specifically deception attacks and thus trigger the appropriate alarms and
further corrective measures. Note that, for Theorems 1 and 2, the upper bounds of the control inputs are
used in Assumption 1 to design the predefined-time distributed observers. In this section, we will show
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through a residual based approach how one can detect process or communication faults/cyber-attacks
with a global approach using input estimates if the control structure is known. In the following, let us
consider the following typical linear higher-order consensus control algorithm [42,43], used with the
available information
ui = − ∑
j∈Ni
asij
[
γs1(zi − zij) +
n
∑
m=2
γsm(ξ̃
i
i,m − ξ̃ ij,m)
]
+ µsi ξ̃
i
i,n (29)
where ∀l ∈ {1, ..., n} , ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N} , γsl and µ
s
i are the consensus gains. It can be noticed that
communication faults spread in the MAS through ui, and thus need to be detected as they occur. In the
absence of edge faults, consensus is achieved provided a suitable selection of µsi , γ
s
1 and γ
s
m due to the
fixed-time stability property of the proposed distributed observers [44].
Proposition 2. Define agent k as the monitoring agent, agent i as the monitored agent, agents p ∈ Nk as agent
k’s neighbours and agents j ∈ Ni as agent i’s neighbours, where agent i may or may not be a direct neighbour of
k and j 6= i. Using protocol (29), an agent k can detect a deception attack on a communication link incident to
agent k or i and local malfunctions/intrusions f ai anywhere in the fleet, given one type fault happens at a time,
using the following residual signal:
rki (t) = V(Iki,n)eq − ûki (30)
where
ûki = − ∑
j∈Ni
asij[γ
s
1(ẑ
k
i − ẑkj ) +
n
∑
m=2
γsm(ξ̃
k
i,m − ξ̃kj,m)] + µsi ξ̃ki,n
is agent i’s reconstructed input by agent k with ûkk = uk.
Proof of Proposition 2. After the convergence of errors, the actual applied control input for each
agent becomes
ui = −∑j∈Ni a
s
ij
[
γs1(zi − zj) + ∑
n
m=2 γ
s
m(ξi,m − ξ j,m)
]
+µsi ξi,n −∑j∈Ni a
s
ij(γ
s
1 f̌
e
ij + ∑
n
m=2 γ
s
m f̌ e
(m−1)
ij )
Furthermore, the reconstructed input generated by the monitoring agent k is expressed as
ûki = −∑j∈Ni a
s
ij
[
γs1(zi − zj) + ∑
n
m=2 γ
s
m(ξi,m − ξ j,m)
]
+µsi ξi,n −∑j∈Ni γ
s
1a
s
ij
[
`i,sk f̌
e
ki − `
j,s
k f̌
e
kj + ∑p∈Nk a
s
kp f
e
kp
−∑p∈Nk a
s
kp f
e
kp
]
+ ∑j∈Ni ∑
n
m=2 a
s
ijγ
s
m
[
`i,sk f̌
e(m−1)
ki
+`
j,s
k f̌
e(m−1)
kj
]
+ µsi
[
`i,sk f̌
e(n−1)
ki + ∑p∈Nk a
s
kp f
e(n−1)
kp
]
Therefore, the residual signals (30) become
rki (t) = (ui − ûki ) + f ai − `
i,s
k f̌
e(n)
ki −∑p∈Nk a
s
kp f
e(n)
kp
= Θkf e + f
a
i
(31)
where Θkf e is
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Θkf e = ∑j∈Ni γ
s
1a
s
ij
[
`i,sk f̌
e
ki − `
j,s
k f̌
e
kj + ∑p∈Nk a
s
kp f
e
kp −∑p∈Nk a
s
kp f
e
kp
]
−∑j∈Ni ∑
n
m=2 a
s
ijγ
s
m
[
`i,sk f̌
e(m−1)
ki + `
j,s
k f̌
e(m−1)
kj
]
− µsi
[
`i,sk f̌
e(n−1)
ki
+∑p∈Nk a
s
kp f
e(n−1)
kp
]
−∑j∈Ni a
s
ij(γ
s
1 f̌
e
ij + ∑
n
m=2 γ
s
m f̌ e
(m−1)
ij )
−`i,sk f̌
e(n)
ki −∑p∈Nk a
s
kp f
e(n)
kp
(32)
Note that, when the control efforts ui are known to other agents in the network, the term (ui − ûki )
in Equation (31) disappears. In this case, the residual signals become
rki (t) = f
a
i − `
i,s
k f̌
e(n)
ki −∑p∈Nk a
s
kp f
e(n)
kp
= Θkf e + f
a
i
(33)
where Θkf e = −`
i,s
k f̌
e(n)
ki −∑p∈Nk a
s
kp f
e(n)
kp . As a result, the defined residual signals (30) generated by the
monitoring agent k are able to detect the presence of a cyber-attack or a local malfunction.
Residual evaluation: Once the residual signals are generated, it is important to be able to interpret
them in order to find the root of the fault and thus make corrective measures accordingly. Indeed,
from Equation (30), it can be noticed that, when a cyber-attack incident to agent k or i occurs while
there is no local malfunction, agent k’s generated residual signal for itself is rkk = 0 and r
k
i 6= 0 for
all k 6= i regardless of whether or not agent i is a neighbour of k. On the other hand, when there
is no cyber-attack, the residuals provide explicit estimations of the local malfunctions/intrusions,
with rkk = f
a
k and r
k
i = f
a
i . r
k
k is thus used to identify a cyber-attack in the system as it is only sensitive
to local malfunctions/intrusions. The proposed cyber-attack identification scheme is thus summarized
in the following Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1: Observer Design and Decision Logic
Result: Distributed Cyber-attack Identification
while communication topology s is active do
Choose observer convergence time Ts in accordance with Proposition 1;
Define Laplacian sub-matrices Lsi and Li,s;
Compute observer gains from Theorems 1–2;
Define a monitoring agent k;
for q ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} do
Generate residual signals rkq from Equation (30);
end
if rkk = 0 and r
k
i = 0 then
No cyber-attack or local malfunctions/intrusions exist in the network;
else if rkk = 0 and r
k
i 6= 0, ∀i 6= k then
A cyber-attack has occurred in the network;
else if rkk 6= 0 and r
k
i = 0 then
A local malfunction has occurred in agent k;
else if rkk = 0 and ∃!i 6= k such that r
k
i 6= 0 then
A local malfunction has occurred in agent i;
end
end
Remark 3. Note that our approach does not present limitation with respect to the number of detectable attacks
in the system, contrary to some existing works, for instance in [26]. Indeed, Proposition 2 can be used to detect
simultaneous local malfunctions/intrusions and cyber-attacks, and discern them from each other thus achieving
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the cyber-attack identification objective. Moreover, the predefined-time stability principle is useful to design fast
converging switched observers to solve the problem of switching communication topologies as pointed out in
Proposition 1. This allows for avoiding false alarms and achieving fast convergence of the estimation errors before
the next topology switching instant. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that our proposed approach can also be
used when sudden communication breaks occur or when communication attacks on the communication weights
and sudden abnormal quality drops of the exchanged information (i.e., attacks on communication parameters asij
defined in Section 2) are considered. Indeed, these types of attacks manifest themselves in the generated residuals
as exponentially decaying signals.
6. Practical Example
Cyber-Attack Identification in Cooperative Multi-Robot Systems
In this section, an illustrative numerical example is given for a practical application in order to
show the effectiveness of the proposed global cyber-attack identification protocol. For this, let us
consider a team of N = 5 omnidirectional wheeled mobile robots (WMR) that are labelled with
numbers 1 through 5 and are moving in a two-dimensional plane (see Figure 2). In this example,
the robots have to cooperate in order to render the steady state axial jerk null and thus achieve constant
linear acceleration synchronization of the network of WMR.
(a) (b)
Figure 2. The setup of the studied problem where: (a) represents the upper perspective view of a WMR
on the x-y 2D plane and (b) represents an illustration of the setup of the five mobile robots.
Here, we assume non-slipping and pure rolling conditions and since our aim is to achieve linear
acceleration synchronization, only the dynamics along the x-direction are considered. In this case,
each robot can be modelled with the following simplified triple integrator dynamics which is a special
case of system (3): 
ẋi(t) = ξ̇i,1(t) = ξi,2(t)
v̇i(t) = ξ̇i,2(t) = ξi,3(t)
ȧi(t) = ξ̇i,3(t) = ui(t) + f ai (t)
zi(t) = ξi,1(t)
where ξi,1(t), ξi,2(t), ξi,3(t) and f ai (t) are the x-position, the linear velocity on the x-axis, the linear
acceleration on the x-axis and an internal fault affecting the local jerk of a robot. The proposed
residual observer-based cyber-attack identification algorithm can be implemented on the on-board
micro-controllers as depicted in Figure 2. Furthermore, the robots are assumed to be equipped with
WiFi modules and broadcast their information through a wireless network described by the graph
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topologies illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 respectively, which are characterised by the Laplacian matrices:
L1 =

3 −1 −1 0 −1
−1 2 0 −1 0
−1 0 1 0 0
0 −1 0 1 0
−1 0 0 0 1
 , and L2 =

3 −1 0 −1 −1
−1 2 −1 0 0
0 −1 1 0 0
−1 0 0 1 0
−1 0 0 0 1
 .
The communication topology is assumed to switch from L1 to L2 at t1 = 12 s. In this example,
in order to achieve acceleration consensus, the following cooperative control is used for each robot
ui = ari (t) + µ
s
i ξ̃
i
i,3 −∑
5
j=1 a
s
ij
[
γs1(z1 − zij)− γs2(ξ̃ ii,2 − ξ̃ ij,2)− γs3(ξ̃ ii,3 − ξ̃ ij,3)
]
where ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, µsi , γs1, γs2 and γs3 are the consensus gains set to 5, 4, 3, and, 2.5, respectively,
for both possible communication topology modes s ∈ {1, 2}, and ari (t) = −µsi 1 m s−2 is the reference
acceleration. Hence, ∀s ∈ {1, 2}, the exchanged signals between agents are given as
zki(t) = `
i,s
k (zi(t) + f̌
e
ki(t) + ∆zki(t)), and ẑ
kj
i (t) = a
s
kj(ẑ
j
i(t) + f
e
kj(t) + ∆ẑ
kj
i (t))
where ∆zki(t) = 0.1 sin(zki(t)), and ∆ẑ
kj
i (t) = 0.01 sin(ẑ
kj
i (t)) are noise due to some
communication uncertainties.
(a)
(b)
Figure 3. An illustration of the interaction between the robots: (a) in the first 12 s and (b) after 12 s,
where an arrow indicates the direction of information flow amongst two designated robots.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4. The corresponding graph topology models, where: (a) corresponds to L1 and (b) to L2.
The initial positions of the five agents on the x-axis are given as ξ1,1(0) = 0 m, ξ2,1(0) = 1.5 m,
ξ3,1(0) = 3 m, ξ4,1(0) = 4.5 m and ξ5,1(0) = 0.5 m respectively, while the initial velocities
and acceleration are set to 0. For each of the mobile robots, the distributed observers are
designed to estimate the global state in the desired predefined time T1 = T2 = 3 s with
T1,1p = T
2,1
p = T
3,1
p = T
1,2
p = T
2,2
p = T
3,2
p = 1 s which satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1. The observer
parameters are chosen as
φ = [α, η, p, q, r]T = [1, 2, 1.5, 3, 0.5]T
used for each corresponding topology. On the other hand, to obtain the equivalent values, first-order
low pass filters are used with cut-off frequency of 100 s−1 for the first dynamics and 10 s−1 for the
second and third dynamics. In order to verify the performance of the proposed scheme, the following
two simulation scenarios are carried out on MATLAB.
First Scenario: In the 1st scenario, an intrusion occurs in robot 3 causing an out of control situation
that affects its local jerk simulated by the following function f a3 (t):
f a3 (t) =

0 t < 4s
0.5 sin(5t) + 15 5s 6 t 6 8.5s
0 t > 8.5s
This fault only represents a local malfunction in the robot 3 and thus needs to be distinguished
from a cyber-attack. It can be clearly seen from Figure 5 corresponding to the 1st scenario that the
residuals generated by the monitoring agents for the monitored agent 3, i.e., r13, r
2
3, r
4
3 and r
4
3 respectively,
provide an explicit estimation of f a3 .
Second Scenario: In the 2nd scenario, a communication fault occurs in exchanges flowing from
robots 1 to 2 at t = Te = 10 s, for the first topology such that
f̌ e12(t) = f
e
12(t) =
{
0 t < 10 s
100(1− e1−0.1t) t > 10 s
Note that the topology switches at t1 = 13 s and f̌ e12(t) = f
e
12(t) remains throughout the topology
change (see Figure 4). Therefore, the gains are computed from Theorem 2 and Remark 2 as
κ11 = 56.98
κ12 = 24.98
κ13 = 24.98
δ11 = 0.35
δ12 = 1.2
δ13 = 1.5
and
κ21 = 58.92
κ22 = 24.98
κ23 = 19.98
δ21 = 0.33
δ22 = 1.2
δ23 = 1.5
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(a) Agent 1’s residual signals (b) Agent 2’s residual signals
(c) Agent 4’s residual signals (d) Agent 5’s residual signals
Figure 5. Residuals in scenario 1 by agents 1, 2, 4, and 5, shown in sub-figures (a–d) respectively.
The vertical dashed blue line represents the convergence time.
It should be recalled that these gains are valid for both scenarios. Figure 6 corresponding to
the 2nd scenario shows that a cyber-attack in the form of the simulated functions f̌ e12(t) and f
e
12(t),
incident to agent 1 in both topologies, can be distinguished even in the presence of some reasonable
communication noise. Indeed, the residual signals r11, r
2
2, r
3
3, r
4
4 and r
5
5 stay around 0 after the
cyber-attack appears in the system and throughout the topology change.
Consequently, according to Proposition 2, one can distinguish and identify a cyber-attack in the
networked system.
(a) Agent 1’s residual signals (b) Agent 2’s residual signals
Figure 6. Cont.
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(c) Agent 3’s residual signals (d) Agent 4’s residual signals
(e) Agent 5’s residual signals
Figure 6. Residuals generated by all agents in scenario 2.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, a novel distributed cyber-attack identification scheme was proposed for NCS with
switching topologies subject to cyber-attacks, where any agent/node can act as a monitor to the
whole system behavior and can thus detect and identify intrusion and cyber attacks. This is done by
employing a bank of distributed predefined-time observers to estimate the global system state through
auxiliary states whereby the settling time is an a priori user defined parameter, independently of the
initial conditions. Numerical simulation results have been carried out by implementing the proposed
scheme on a synchronization seeking network of mobile robots. Future works will include the design
of a control reconfiguration algorithm based on the estimated faults from our FDI scheme.
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